講座題目：Do Local Governments Site Nuisance Activities Along Borders? An Empirical Strategy Applied to Wind Turbines

主講人：Justin M. Ross（美國印第安納大學公共與環境事務學院）

講座時間：2018年5月31日（周四）上午10: 00-12：00

講座地點：bevictor伟德官网學院南路校區主教211

ABSTRACT: The ability of communities to realize Pareto efficient outcomes may potentially be realized through the practice of fiscal zoning. A common concern to this theory is the prospect that political boundaries may undermine this process. If nuisance entities produce negative externalities that decay over distance and the host fee compensation is completely internalized, then host fee compensation need not reflect the full external damages if the nuisance is sited along a political border. Furthermore, if a nuisance entity can credibly commit to being sited on either side of the border, host fee compensation can fall to zero. This paper presents a simple theoretical model that describes an empirical strategy for testing the political boundary hypothesis among local governments in an important environmental context. The strategy is applied to wind turbines in the continental United States across 1,230 local governments. The results are not supportive of the concerns and actually indicate that land near political boundaries is less likely to be used for nuisance siting.

主講人簡介：Justin M. Ross, 西弗吉尼亞大學博士，美國印第安納大學公共與環境事務學院副教授，地方政府治理協會主席。近年來，他的論文在National Tax Journal， Public Administration Review，Public Finance Review，Public Budgeting & Finance 等國際頂級期刊發表30餘篇，參加了World Bank, State Tax Notes, Government Finance Review等國際會議研讨會。他還是 National Tax Association, Association for Budgeting & Financial Management, American Economics Association, Public Choice Society 與 Southern Economic Association的會員。